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HERBSTER v. NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY FOR
LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE:* ATTORNEY'S
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE ACTION UNJUSTLY
DISMISSED
As a general rule, employment contracts are terminable at will.'
In order to avoid the harsh consequences' of this general rule,
courts3 have recently developed the common law tort of retaliatory
150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986).
1. An at will employment relationship is one which has no specific duration and
the employer or employee may terminate the relationship at will, with or without
cause. Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 666, 384 N.E. 2d 91, 93
(1978). See At-Will Employment, A.B.A. 2 SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. COMMITTEE
REP. 15 (1982) (the American rule and English background of at will employment);
*

Berendt, Employment Contracts, ILL.

INST. FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.

§ 8.8 (1983

& 1986 Supp.) (discussion of an at will employment relationship); Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1976) (major emphasis on modification of the
at will employment concept); Peck, Unjust Discharge from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979) (proposing that an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from employment needs protection); Note, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good
Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816 (1980) (proposing a revision of common law rules to
provide at will employees with a remedy when wrongfully discharged) [hereinafter
Protecting Employees]; Annotation, Modern Status of Rule That Employer May
Discharge At- Will Employee for Any Reason, 12 A.L.R. 4th 544 (1982) (general theories and case law of at will employment relationships). Cf. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976) (advocating statutory reform for unfair dismissals). But cf. Grauer v. Valve & Primer
Corp., 47 Ill. App. 3d 152, 361 N.E.2d 863 (1977) (memo supporting a contract of
annual duration, thus, employment contract was not terminable at will). See generally H. PERRIrr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 1 (1984) (historical discussion of the employment at will rule originating during the industrial revolution); 53
AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant § 43 (1970) (discussing the discharge of employees);
Carley, At-Will Employees Still Vulnerable, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1, 1987, at 66 (limitations
on the right of employers to end at will employment relationships).
2. The employer always has an upperhand, thus, an employer and employee are
not on equal footing. Blades, supra note 1 at 1404-05. See Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 129, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981) (states the need for a
balance between the employer's interest in operating a business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a livelihood, and society's expectation that
public policy is carried out). See also Protecting Employees, supra note 1, at 1824
(employer's absolute discretion in an at will employment relationship).
3. Twenty-two jurisdictions have expressly adopted a public policy exception to
the general rule of employment at will. The following states, in highest appellate
court decisions, or in uncontradicted lower court opinions, recognize retaliatory discharge: Arizona; Arkansas; California; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Hawaii; Illinois; Kentucky; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Montana; New Hampshire; New
Jersey; New Mexico; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Texas; Virginia; Washington; and West
Virginia. Solin, Current National Trends and Strategies in Wrongful Termination

Litigation, 15

ANN. INST. ON EMPLOYMENT

L. 309, 408 (1986). The following 13 states
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discharge, which is founded upon an employer's discharge of an em-

ployee in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy." Illinois
courts first recognized retaliatory discharge in 1978, 5 but are reluchave recognized the exception in part or have conflicting decisions on the issue: Colorado; Idaho; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Maine; Minnesota; Missouri; Nevada; North Carolina; South Carolina; Tennessee; and Wisconsin. Id. Finally, the following 16 jurisdictions deny the existence of a public policy exception or have not addressed the
issue: Alabama; Alaska; District of Columbia; Georgia; Lousiana; Mississippi; Nebraska; New York; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Puerto Rico; Rhode Island; South
Dakota; Utah; Vermont; and Wyoming. Id. at 409. For a detailed state-by-state analysis of recent court decisions relating to the common law rule of employment at will,

see The Employment-At-Will-Issue, A BUREAU OF
8 (Nov. 19, 1982) [hereinafter BUREAU REPORT].

NATIONAL AFFAIRS SPECIAL REPORT

4. Retaliatory discharge, frequently called wrongful discharge, abusive discharge, or discharge in derogation of public policy, was first recognized as a newly
developed rule of law in Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396,
174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25, 29 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1959). An employee discharged
for refusing to violate a criminal statute can bring a retaliatory discharge cause of
action. Id. Thus, an employee cannot be discharged from employment for acting in
furtherance of public policy or for refusing to violate a public policy. Id. at 188-89,
344 P.2d at 27-28, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 400. See Blades, supra note 1, at 1404. Following
Petermann, numerous courts involved in workers' compensation disputes based their
decisions on public policy. See, e.g., Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143,
473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984) (employee fired for filing under Workers' Compensation Act);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (women filing workers'
compensation claim discharged from employment); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill.
App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977) (employee discharged for filing workers' compensation claim may bring a cause of action against his employer); Frampton v. Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973) (exception to at will employment
when an employee is discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim). See generally Annotation, Liability for DischargingAt- Will Employee for Refusing to Participate in, or for Disclosing, Unlawful or Unethical Acts of Employer or Coemployees,
9 A.L.R. 4th 329 (1981) (analysis of whether an at will employee can bring a cause of
action for wrongful discharge). The courts began to realize that an employer and employee do not stand on equal footing. Blades, supra note 1, at 1404-05; Palmateer,85
Ill. 2d at 129, 421 N.E.2d at 878. Courts eventually relied on public policy to limit the
exercise of the employer's power to discharge "in contravention of a clearly mandated
public policy." Id. at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 881. Thus, courts allow a retaliatory discharge cause of action where an employee is fired for refusing to violate a statute.
Compare Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 839 (1980) (employee's refusal to engage in price fixing); Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d at
124, 421 N.E.2d at 876 (employee fired for supplying information to police about suspected wrongful doing of fellow employee); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416,
390 A.2d 149 (1970) (employee fired for refusing to practice medicine without a license); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978) (an employee's refusal to violate a credit code) with Lansen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz.
507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) (employee discharged for attending night school); Keneally
v. Oregon, 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980) (worker discharged for taking too much
sick time); Jones v. Keogh, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979) (employee attempted to
examine company's books in his capacity as a shareholder, and was discharged).
Courts rejecting a retaliatory discharge cause of action do so out of deference to the
legislature. Those courts argue that any substantive prohibition of retaliation should
be adopted by an elected body. See Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (court refused retaliatory discharge cause of action, stating that it

is a matter for legislative determination). See also W. HOLLOWAY, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 430 (1985) (summary of state statutes that support
public policies for purposes of a retaliatory discharge cause of action).
5. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 177, 384 N.E.2d at 358-59. In the Kelsay decision, the
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tant e to expand the tort. Unlike other jurisdictions, 7 Illinois has not
developed an efficient way of analyzing retaliatory discharge causes
of action.9 Instead, Illinois courts analyze retaliatory discharge cases
Supreme Court of Illinois recognized a retaliatory discharge cause of action for the
first time. The court based its decision on the public policy of the Workers' Compensation Act, which provides that an employee deserves an efficient and expeditious
remedy when injured on the job. Moreover, the court stated that "[wie are not convinced that an employer's otherwise absolute power to terminate an employee at will
should prevail when that power is exercised to prevent the employee from asserting
his statutory rights under the Workers' Compensation Act." Id. at 181, 384 N.E.2d at
357. But cf. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977) (when legislature does not provide for a retaliatory discharge cause of action, employer liability
cannot be assessed).
6. An Illinois court recently stated: "This court has not, by its Palmateerand
Kelsay decisions, 'rejected a narrow interpretation of the retaliatory discharge tort'
and does not 'strongly support' the expansion of the tort." Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.
106 I1. 2d 520, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356 (1985). Thus, based on this recent decision, Illinois courts clearly favor the general rule of employment at will unless there is
a clear cut public policy exception. Id. Without this exception, employees can be fired
with or without cause. See supra notes 1-3 for an extensive analysis of the at will
employment setting. See generally W. PROSSER, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 1 (5th ed. 1984) (demonstrating the fluctuation of tort law and the protection of plaintiffs' interests). Prosser stated:
New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly, and the progress of
the common law is marked by many cases of first impression, in which the
court has struck out boldly to create a new cause of action, where none had
been recognized before . . . . The law of torts is anything but static, and the
limits of its development are never set. When it becomes clear that the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection against the conduct of the defendant, the mere fact that the claim is novel will not of itself operate as a bar
to the remedy.
Id. at 3-4.
7. In order to avoid the harshness of the American rule of employment at will,
France, Germany, England and Sweden protect against unjust dismissals through legislation. See Summers, supra note 1, at 508-19. France adopted a principle known as
"abus de droit," (abuse of right) which makes abusive termination a tort if malicious
intent, culpable negligence, or capriciousness is involved. Id. at 510. Germany disallows a termination unless four weeks notice is given. Id. at 511. England adopted a
statute in 1971 providing full protection against unjust dismissal. Id. at 513. Sweden
requires one month advance notice before an employee can be terminated. Id. at 517.
Furthermore, the Swedish statute requires the employer to prove an objective cause
for the dismissal. Id.
8. Beginning in 1978 with the Kelsay decision, Illinois courts have inconsistently decided cases in the area of retaliatory discharge. Compare Palmateer,85 Ill.
2d at 124, 421 N.E.2d at 876 (court held that when a clear public policy is contravened, a retaliatory discharge cause of action can be maintained, thus carving out
another exception to at will employment other than in the workers' compensation
context) with Rozier v. St. Mary's Hosp., 88 I1. App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d 50 (1980)
(after recognizing the rule stated in Kelsay, the court restricted the public policy
limitation on discharge of at will employees to the workers' compensation context).
See also Barr, 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985) (narrow interpretation of retaliatory discharge, thus, cause of action is limited).
9. Illinois courts recognize a retaliatory discharge cause of action when two elements are met. First, the employer must discharge the employee in retaliation for the
employee's activities. Second, the discharge must be in contravention of a clearly
mandated public policy. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 134, 421 N.E.2d at 881. See also
Barr, 106 Ill.
2d at 529, 478 N.E.2d at 1358 (although elements set out identical to
Palmateer, court adhered to a narrow interpretation of retaliatory discharge).
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on a case-by-case approach. 0 This lack of procedure was recently
evidenced in Herbster v.North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance,1' when the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District addressed the issue of whether an attorney-employee 2 may
bring a retaliatory discharge cause of action against his corporate
employer. The Herbster court held that although the public policy' 3
of preventing the obstruction of justice"' was contravened, attorneys
have no cause of action for retaliatory discharge because of the attorney-client relationship.'5
Robert W. Herbster, a former in-house corporate attorney,"
filed a retaliatory discharge suit against his past employer, North
American Company for Life and Health Insurance ("North Ameri-

can"). The complaint alleged that Mr. Herbster was wrongfully discharged"' after refusing to destroy or remove certain subpoenaed
10. Illinois courts look at the specific facts of each case to determine if a retaliatory discharge cause of action exists. See Price v. Carmack Datsun, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d
65, 485 N.E.2d 359 (1985) (employee filing a claim under health insurance); Wheeler
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985) (employee discharged for refusing to work in x-ray department); Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d at 124, 421
N.E.2d at 876 (employee fired for reporting a crime); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 11.
2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (employee discharged after filing under workers' compensation act); Thomas v. Zamberletti, 134 Ill. App. 3d 387, 480 N.E.2d 869 (1985)
(employee alleged discharge for receiving medical treatment); Mein v. Masonite
Corp., 124 Il. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d 1137 (1984) (employee brought action against
employer for discharge based on age); Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 111 Ill. App.
3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982) (employee discharged for reporting discrepancy in financial records).
11. 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (1986). See generally Closen & Wojcik,
Lawyers Out in the Cold, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 94 (discussing the adverse effect
of Herbster on lawyers, the legal profession, and the administration of justice).
12. For a discussion of whether an attorney can be an employee, see infra note
68 and accompanying text.
13. The Palmateercourt stated that "[a]lthough there is no line of demarcation
dividing matters that are the subject of public policies from matters purely personal
...a matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed." Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at
878. For a further discussion of the public policy element, see generally M. POLELLE,
ILLINOIS TORT LAW 369 (1985) (retaliatory discharge claim based on tort theory);

Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposalin Aid of ProfessionalEthics, 28 VAND. L.
REv. 805, 826-27 (1975) (professionals and the public policy element based on their
specific occupation). A retaliatory discharge cause of action is permitted where public
policy is clear, but is denied where private interests are involved. Palmateer, 85 I11.
2d at 131, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 31-4(a) (1985).
15. Herbster, 150 Ill.
App. 3d at 29-30, 501 N.E.2d at 348. For a discussion of
the attorney-client relationship, see infra notes 86, 94 and accompanying text.
16. Mr. Herbster was a licensed attorney and was employed as chief legal officer
and vice-president in charge of North American's legal department. Herbster, 150 Ill.
App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
17. Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins.,
150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (No. 2-85-42) (1986) [hereinafter Appellant's
Brief].
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documents's at the request of North American corporate officials.",
The complaint further stated that if Mr. Herbster destroyed or re-

moved the documents, he would have violated the Illinois Code of
Professional Responsibility. 0 North American subsequently filed a
motion for summary judgment l based on the fact that Mr. Herbster's employment contract was an oral contract terminable at will.22
Also, North American contended that Mr. Herbster was discharged
for legitimate reasons.2 8 The circuit court granted North American's
motion for summary judgment, holding that the uniqueness" of the
attorney-client relationship between Mr. Herbster and North Amer-

ican precluded a retaliatory discharge cause of action.
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.2 The
court addressed the issue of whether an attorney, who works solely
for a large corporation, may bring a retaliatory discharge cause of
18. The documents had been requested in lawsuits pending in Alabama against
North American and other insurance companies. Id. at 2. The documents came from
North American's actuarial department, and if made available to the Alabama plaintiffs, supported allegations of fraud in the sale of so called flexible annuities. Id.
19. The complaint alleged that on June 29, 1983, Elliot Leitner, a vice-president
of North American, and Paul C. Colette, the president and chief executive of North
American, told Mr. Herbster to remove or destroy the incriminating documents. Id.
at 5.
20. The Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall
not . . . engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, DR 1-102(a)(5) (1985). It further states that "[a] lawyer shall not
suppress any evidence that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce." Id. at DR 7-109(a) (1985). See Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at
344 (court's acknowledgment that the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
would be violated if Mr. Herbster committed the illegal act of removing or destroying
discovery documents).
21. On September 24, 1984, North American filed its motion for summary judgment pursuant to 2-1005 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. Appellant's Brief,
supra note 17, at 7. The trial court judge stated that "whether the plaintiff [Herbster] was or was not specifically instructed to destroy or take out of the files material
that might have been the subject matter of the production order in the Alabama
court . . . is an issue of fact ...." Record at 27, Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 501
N.E.2d 343 (No. 2-85-42) (1986). After the court held that the complaint stated a
cause of action, it analyzed the public policy involved and reasoned that a conflict
existed between the considerations underlying Palmateer,and the protection of confidentiality between an attorney and a client. Appellant's Brief, supra note, 17, at 10.
Thus, the court decided that the public policy considerations of confidentiality must
prevail and granted North American's motion for summary judgment. Id.
22. For a discussion of at will employment, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
23. North American alleged that Mr. Herbster was terminated because of his
unsatisfactory performance in his employment capacity. Appellant's Brief, supra note
17, at 6-8.
24. For a discussion of the attorney-client relationship, see infra notes 86, 94
and accompanying text.
25. At the trial court level, the attorney's briefs focused on the privilege aspect
of the attorney-client relationship. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
The appellate court found that all aspects of the attorney-client relationship are important, not just the attorney-client privilege. Id. For a discussion of what constitutes
the attorney-client relationship, see infra notes 86, 94 and accompanying text.
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action against that corporation. Although the court found that Mr.
Herbster was discharged in contravention of a clearly mandated"6

public policy, 27 it reasoned that the adverse impact of allowing at-

torneys to sue their clients precluded Mr. Herbster from bringing a
retaliatory discharge cause of action."' Thus, in Illinois, when an attorney is hired in his legal capacity, he does not have a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge against his employer. The court further noted that an expansion" of the tort of retaliatory discharge
was not justified because of the mutuality of choice3" inherent in the
legal profession."'
Initially, the court set forth the two elements necessary to bring
a retaliatory discharge cause of action in Illinois. First, the employer
must have discharged the employee in retaliation for the employee's
activities."2 Second, the discharge must be in contravention of a
26. Mr. Herbster would have violated both criminal statutes and ethical rules if
he had performed the act which North American requested. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, 1 31-4(a) (1985) (obstruction of justice is a criminal offense); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, DR 1-102, 7-102(a)(3) (1985) (attorney cannot prejudice justice and must ploduce all necessary evidence).
27. See supra note 13. Public policy can usually be found in a state's constitution or statutes, and when they are silent, judicial decisions can be examined.
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878
(1981). One of the most compelling public policies is when the employee refuses to
commit an unlawful act. W. HOLLOWAY.

EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REME-

DIES 264 (1985). Cf. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980) (court recognizes public policy from various sources, including judicial decisions). But cf. Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834
(1983) (court held that public policy must be evidenced by a constitutional or statutory provision).
28. A retaliatory discharge cause of action can be based on contract or tort theory. BUREAU REPORT, supra note 3, at 3. When proceeding under a contract theory,
courts have held that employers are liable based on the implied covenant of good
faith. Courts hold that where the employer discharged an at will employee in violation of good faith requirements, a cause of action exists because of the employer's
breach of the implied contract of good faith. H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW
AND PRACTICE 122 (1984). Illinois does not recognize a retaliatory discharge cause of
action based on a contract theory. Berendt, Employment Contracts, ILL. INST. FOR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. § 8 (1983 & 1986 Supp.). See also Fortune v. National Cash
Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977) (employee recovered on implied
good faith and fair dealing for a wrongful discharge cause of action); Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co, 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (employer who terminates an at will
employee in bad faith or retaliation commits a breach of the employment contract).
29. Due to the fact that an employer and employee do not stand on equal footing, courts emphasize the growing need for the tort of retaliatory discharge. Herbster,
150 Ill. App. 3d at, 23, 501 N.E.2d at 345 (1986), (quoting Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d 124,
129, 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1981)). See generally BUREAU REPORT, supra note 3, at 19
(employment at will discussed by labor relations experts and predictions for the
1980's).
30. The Herbster court reasoned that attorneys have more job opportunities
than other employees, thus, the court distinguished Mr. Herbster from a traditional
employee. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
31. Id.
32. For a discussion of the elements of a retaliatory discharge cause of action,
see supra note 9. See also Mein v. Masonite Corp., 124 11. App. 3d 617, 464 N.E.2d

Herbster v. North American Company

19871

clearly mandated public policy." Although the court acknowledged 3'
that there were public policy considerations" in this case to support
the second element of the tort" and that Mr. Herbster was discharged in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy,37 it
neglected to decide whether Mr. Herbster was discharged for his activities as an employee. 8
While the court ignored this element of the tort, it went on to
note that because an employer and employee do not stand on equal
footing," there is a growing need for expansion of the tort of retaliatory discharge. 4 The court, however, in order to determine whether
Mr. Herbster was an employee within the meaning of established

case law,"' asserted the importance of examining historical considerations of the retaliatory discharge tort.' The court concluded that
Mr. Herbster was not an employee because of his profession as an
4
attorney.
The court reasoned that attorneys are unlike the typical employees of past retaliatory discharge cases because an attorney enjoys an abundance of job opportunities. 44 Moreover, the court relied
1137 (1984) (employee failed to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge because elements were not met).
33. For a discussion of public policy, see supra notes 13, 27.
34. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23-24, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
35. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 31-4(a) (1985) (obstructing justice is a criminal
offense); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, DR 1-102(5), 7-109(a) (1985) (lawyer cannot engage
in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or suppress evidence that he
has a legal obligation to reveal).
36. For a discussion of the contract and tort theories of retaliatory discharge,

see supra note 28. See also J.

BARBASH. UNJUST DISMISSAL AND AT WILL EMPLOYMENT

29 (1982) (differences of tort and contract theory as it relates to retaliatory discharge
and their respective remedies).
37. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
38. An employee must be discharged for his activities. Id. Mr. Herbster was
asked to remove or destroy discovery documents and he refused to do so because of
his ethical responsibility to the legal profession. Id. Shortly after his refusal to violate
the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, he was discharged. Id.
39. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 25, 501 N.E.2d at 345. See also Blades, supra
note 1, at 1404 (demonstrates the advantage an employer has over an employee, thus,
the employee is left in an unprotected position).
40. Herbster,150 11. App. 3d at 24, 501 N.E.2d at 345, (citing Palmateer,85 II.
2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)).
41. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 501 N.E.2d at 344. See Kelsay, 74 11. 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (first Illinois court to recognize retaliatory discharge cause
of action for an employee).
42. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
43. Id. at 30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
44. Id. A recent survey, however, stated that "[diespite the glowing nature of a
90.6% employment rate . . . jobs remain hard to get for the most part, even at the
most well known law schools in the country." NATIONAL Ass'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT,
INC.. CLASS OF

1983

EMPLOYMENT REPORT AND SALARY SURVEY

(10th ed. 1985). In sup-

port of this proposition, Mr. Herbster was unemployed for five months after his discharge from North American despite his excellent credentials. Appellant's Petition
for Leave to Appeal, at 9, Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill.
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heavily upon the attorney-client relationship"' to bolster its conclu-

sion that an attorney cannot bring a retaliatory discharge cause of
action. The court found that the attorney-client relationship encompasses mutual trust, exchanges of confidence, and reliance on an at-

torney's judgment.'6 Therefore, an attorney bringing suit against his
client would have serious impact on the attorney-client relationship
because of the deterioration of these factors.47 Finally, the Herbster
court deferred to the public policy that an attorney-client relation-

ship must promote full and frank consultation between a client and
an attorney, without the fear of disclosure. 48 Consequently, the court
held that an attorney cannot be an employee because of his unique
relationship with his client,4' and barred Mr. Herbster from bringing
a retaliatory discharge cause of action.

The Herbster court improperly concluded that Mr. Herbster
was not entitled to bring a retaliatory discharge cause of action. The
court's reasoning is deficient for two reasons. First, the court failed
to recognize that Mr. Herbster was an employee5" in a corporate setting. Second, the court unjustifiably neglected to redress a violation
of the clearly mandated public policy of preventing the obstruction
of justice.5 Moreover, the court had the opportunity to expand the

tort of retaliatory discharge into a needed employment setting. Instead, the court circumvented the issue and delivered a superficial
App. 3d 21, 501 N.E.2d 343 (No. 85-0042) (1986) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief for
Leave to Appeal].
45. For a discussion of the attorney-client relationship, see infra notes 86, 94
and accompanying text. See generally Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundationsof the Attorney-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976) (discussion of
attorney's duty to his client and promoting confidentiality).
46. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 29-30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 27, 501 N.E.2d at 346-47. For a general discussion of the attorneyclient privilege, see C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87 (3d ed. 1984)
(background and policy of the attorney-client privilege); Gardner, The Crime or
Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708 (1961) (author
discusses the rationale behind the attorney-client privilege, and its exceptions); Comment, Witness-Competency-Whether Confidential Relations by Client to Attorney
Regarding Future Criminal or Fraudulent Transactions Must be Divulged, 33 CmKENT L. REV. 271, 273 (1955) (requirements for attorney-client privilege to exist).
49. Herbster, 150 11. App. 3d at 29-30, 501 N.E.2d at 348.
50. For a discussion of Illinois case law defining an employee, see infra notes
53-55 and accompanying text.
51. For a definition of public policy, see supra note 13. Some courts, however,
require a statutory source for the actions which led to the discharge. See Hamblen v.
Danners, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 926 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (in absence of statutory directive,
there is no public policy violation in discharge of employee who refuses to take polygraph examination); Rice v. Grant County Bd. of Comm'rs, 472 N.E.2d 213 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1984) (no public policy violated where traffic statutes did not confer a right
upon an individual). Cf. Pepsi Cola Gen. Bottlers, Inc. v. Woods, 440 N.E.2d 969
(Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (public policy exception to employee at will rule prevails when
employee is discharged for exercising a right conferred on him by statute, constitution, or other positive law).
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opinion which leaves attorneys in an unprotected position.
The Herbster court inaccurately analyzed the relationship between Mr. Herbster and North American. Even though Mr. Herbster was an attorney, he was clearly an employee 2 of North American. In determing whether an individual is an employee, Illinois
courts traditionally look to three elements. First, the employer must
have control over the employee.5s Second, a contract must exist between the employer and employee."" Finally, the employee must be
52. For a discussion of a professional employee, see infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
53. The control element is crucial in analyzing whether an employer-employee
relationship exists. See American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Wypior, 365 F.2d
164 (7th Cir. 1966) (Illinois courts require control, contract, and compensation in an
employer-employee relationship); Carroll v. Social Security Bd., 128 F.2d 876 (7th
Cir. 1942) (essential characteristic of employer-employee relationship is that the employer retains the right to control and direct the individual performing the services);
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Chadwell, 426 F. Supp. 550 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (employeremployee relationship requires control over the employee); Gundich v. Emerson-Comstock Co., 21 111. 2d 117, 171 N.E.2d 60 (1961) (a master-servant relationship is premised upon the employer's right to control, which includes the power to discharge);
Circle Sec. Agency, Inc. v. Ross, 107 I1. App. 3d 195, 437 N.E.2d 667 (1982) (essential
characteristic of relationship is employer's control over employeee's work); Jones v.
Atterberry, 77 Ill. App. 3d 463, 396 N.E.2d 104 (1979) (right to control the manner in
which an employee's work is performed is probably most important element in determining whether employer-employee relationship exists); Lilly v. County of Cook, 60
Ill. App. 3d 573, 377 N.E.2d 136 (1978) (manner of supervision of work done is fact to
consider when determining an employer-employee relationship); Balfour v. Dohrn
Transfer Co., 328 Ill. App. 163, 65 N.E.2d 624 (1946) (primary element of the employer-employee relationship is the source and nature of control).
Many jurisdictions are in harmony with Illinois case law, and hold that the control element is one of the most important elements to satisfy when proving an employer-employee relationship. See Florida Gulf Coast Symphony, Inc. v. Department
of Labor & Employment Sec., 386 So. 2d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (musicians
declared not employees because of lack of control over their performances); Sloan v.
Hobbs Sporting Goods Shop, 145 Ga. App. 255, 243 S.E.2d 673 (1978) (employer
must be able to control method of performance of employee's work); Johnson v. Maricle, 386 So. 2d 677 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (employee must be under continuous auspices
of his employer's control); L.M.T. Steel Prods. v. Peirson, 47 Md. App. 633, 425 A.2d
242 (1981) (the only element that has significance in determining the employer-employee relationship is the power or right to control); Iverson v. Independent School
Dist., 257 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1977) (bus driver for school district was not an employee of school district because it had no control over him); McCabe & Willig Realty, Inc. v. Ross, 80 A.D.2d 935, 437 N.Y.S.2d 770 (1981) (salespersons who were
furnished limited amount of office space may not be considered employees because of
lack of control); Ackley v. State, 592 S.W.2d 606 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (servant is
person who is controlled in his employment); Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980) (employer's performance must be subject to
comparatively high degree of control). See generally 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master and Servant §§ 1-2 (1970) (definition of employer-employee relationship); 56 C.J.S. Master
and Servant §§ 1-2 (1948) (definition and existence of relationship between employer
and employee); 17 ILL. L. AND PRAC. EMPLOYMENT § 2 (1956) (requirements needed for
an employer-employee relationship to exist).
54. The normal indicia required for an employer-employee relationship are control, contract, and compensation. Wypior, 365 F.2d at 167. See Chadwell, 426 F.
Supp. at 553 (highlight of characteristics law attributes to employment relationship).
See also Sloan, 145 Ga. App. at 256, 243 S.E.2d at 673 (test for whether person em-
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compensated for his services."
As to the first element, North American controlled the manner
and means of Mr. Herbster's work. Mr. Herbster was chief legal officer and vice-president in charge of the legal department for North
American.5" He owed duties to the corporate board of directors,
shareholders, and officers. 57 Thus, Mr. Herbster's work was subject
58
to the review of his superiors.

Unlike an independent contractor,5 9 North American presuma-

bly controlled the time, method, and manner in which Mr. Herbster
performed his work.6" An employer, however, need only possess,
rather than exercise, control over a person's work, in order to satisfy
ployed is an employee).
55. Some courts hold that compensation for services is necessary in a true employer-employee relationship. See Wypior, 365 F.2d at 167 (court held that compensation was important, but it did not need to be in the form of money); Chadwell, 426
F. Supp. at 553 (employee who has been compensated without existence of contract
or control is not an employee); Johnson, 386 So. 2d at 262 (necessity of method of
payment in determining individual's status as employee). Since compensation can be
found in almost all working relationships, it may not always determine whether a
person is not an employee in the absence of a contract and control over the employee.
For a discussion of the contract and control elements, see supra notes 53-54.
56. Herbster, 150 I1. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
57. Id. at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346.
58. Mr. Herbster's superiors were named in the appellant's brief. The brief
named Paul C. Colette, president of North American, Elliot Leitner, vice-president,
and Richard W. Hadley, an executive vice-president of North American. Appellant's
Brief, supra note 17, at 7. Presumably, Mr. Herbster's performance was reviewable by
any one-or all of these officials.
59. Note that determining the nature of an employment relationship depends
upon an analysis of the particular facts of each case. See Hindle v. Dillbeck, 68 Ill. 2d
309, 370 N.E.2d 165 (1977) (person transporting passengers in course of employment
was employee); Kouba v. East Joliet Bank, 135 I1. App. 3d 264, 481 N.E.2d 235
(1985) (agency hired to repossess automobile is independent contractor and is liable
for its acts because there is no element of control); Pemberton v. Medical Emergency
Servs. Assocs., 117 Ill. App. 3d 502, 453 N.E.2d 802 (1983) (doctor who is subject to
audits and other review procedures not an independent contractor, but is an employee due to the existence of control over him). See also Iverson v. Independent
School Dist., 257 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1977) (bus company hired for services is an
independent contractor); Friend v. Audits & Survey Co., 64 A.D.2d 800, 407 N.Y.S.2d
924 (1978) (interviewers hired to take surveys who work out of their homes are employees because supervision exists). The question of whether a person is an employee
or a general contractor is a question of fact for the jury to decide. DeRosa v. Albert F.
Amling Co., 84 I1. App. 3d 64, 404 N.E.2d 564 (1980).
60. One can assume that Mr. Herbster, as an employee of North American, had
deadlines to meet, meetings to attend, and duties to fulfill. Consequently, he was
under the supervision of corporate officials. For the names and titles of the corporate
officials, see supra note 58.
The facts of the case show that Mr. Herbster was in an authority position as
chief legal officer and vice-president of North American. Therefore, Mr. Herbster
would not be supervised in the same manner as a traditional employee. This does not
preclude him, however, from being classified as an employee. See L.M.T. Steel Prods.,
Inc. v. Pierson, 47 Md. App. 633, 636, 425 A.2d 242, 245 (1981) (general foreman on a
project is less likely to be subject to the supervision that other employees receive).
For a discussion of the supervision necessary when a professional employee is involved, see infra notes 61, 74.
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the control requirement."' Accordingly, the control element existed
in the relationship between Mr. Herbster and North American because North American possessed control, even though it may not
have exercised its authority over Mr. Herbster.
The second element necessary to determine if Mr. Herbster was
an employee is the existence of a contract. Undoubtedly, a contract
existed between Mr. Herbster and North American. 2 The court recognized its existence when it stated that North American employed
Mr. Herbster under an oral contract s which was terminable at
will.' Furthermore, the parties stipulated that the contract existed.65 Therefore, it was evident that a contract existed between Mr.
Herbster and North American.
Third, Mr. Herbster was compensated for his services. He was a
salaried employee, received employment benefits, and was not on a
contingent fee basis.6 6 Furthermore, Mr. Herbster's employment
with North American was his only means of economic support. 67
Clearly, Mr. Herbster met the third element of being compensated

for his services.
In addition to satisfying these elements, further authority for
the proposition that an attorney can also be an employee is found in
other jurisdictions." Similar to an attorney, who can be fired at his
61. See American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Wypior, 365 F.2d 164 (1966)
(in an employer-employee relationship, the employer only has to possess control,
thus, the fact that it is never exercised is irrelevant); L.M.T. Steel Prods., Inc., 47
Md. App. at 633, 425 A.2d at 242 (master-servant relationship does not require the
actual exercise of supervision when employee is in an authoritative position); Friend,
64 A.D.2d at 800, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (depending on the type of occupation, supervision may be less visible).
62. For a general discussion of the contract requirement between an employer
and employee, see supra note 54.
63. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344. The contract can be oral
or written. Sloan v. Hobbs Sporting Goods Shop, 145 Ga. App. 255, 256, 243 S.E.2d
673, 674 (1978).
64. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344. For an in-depth analysis
of the employment at will rule, see supra notes 1-3.
65. Because the court clearly established that an oral contract existed between
Mr. Herbster and North American, it is presumed that the parties stipulated to the
existence of the contract. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
66. Id. For relevant case law discussing the compensation element, see supra
note 55.
67. Mr. Herbster did not have a private practice of law. All of his efforts were
devoted to North American. Thus, all financial support came from North American.
Appellant's Brief for Leave to Appeal, supra note 44, at 9.
68. Pennsylvania is a leading jurisdiction on the issue of whether a professional
person can also be an employee. See Budzichowski v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 503 Pa. 160,
469 A.2d 111 (1983) (doctors who work for telephone company are employees and
cannot be sued by fellow employee); Kinloch v. Tonsey, 325 Pa. Super. 476, 473 A.2d
167 (1984) (doctor who works for company is employee, rather than independent contractor); Babich v. Pavich, 488 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218 (1980) (doctor who works
in steel plant medical dispensary is employee and not independent contractor). All
these cases are analogous to an attorney working for a corporation. Both an attorney
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client's discretion, a doctor can be fired at his patient's discretion. In
both instances, however, the attorney or doctor should not be discharged at the discretion of his employer when the employer has
contravened a clearly mandated public policy. For example, in
Kinloch v. Tonsey,"9 a Pennsylvania court found that a doctor employed as medical director of a company70 was an employee. To sustain this conclusion, the court primarily relied on three facts. First,
the doctor worked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., five days a week,
fifty-two weeks a year, as a full-time employee. 71 Second, the company paid the doctor a monthly salary.72 Third, the doctor received
standard fringe benefits, which included medical
insurance, life in7
surance, vacation, and an investment plan. 1
Additionally, the Kinloch court stated that "an employer-employee relationship may be found even though a particular occupation may involve such technical skill that the employer is wholly incapable of supervising the details of performance." 7' Thus, when a
and a doctor are professionals who can also be employees.
Most cases arise when the professional is working in an employment setting and
is sued for his actions. Courts have been liberal in holding that under the Workers'
Compensation Act, the individual cannot be sued because he is an employee. See
Komel v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 56 Ill. App. 3d 967, 372 N.E.2d 842 (1978) (employee bringing action against doctor who works for a company is barred from recovering because doctor is co-employee). See also In re Concourse Opthalmology Assocs.,
P.C., 89 A.D.2d 1047, 456 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1982) (opthalmologists performing services
in provided office space are employees to certain extent); Gullack v. Catherwood, 27
A.D.2d 759, 276 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (1967) (attorney who was free to engage in private
legal practice can also be employee). In further support that an attorney can be an
employee, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 223 comment a (1958), which
states that "[elven in the case of attorneys and physicians there may be the master
and servant relation, as where a firm of attorneys employs an attorney as a member
of the office staff ...." Id. Based on this assertion, an attorney who is working for a
large corporation can also be an employee. Clearly, Mr. Herbster was an attorneyemployee in this case.
69. 325 Pa. Super. 476, 473 A.2d 167 (1984). For a discussion of an accountant
employed in his professional capacity, see generally Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of ProfessionalEmployees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts:
A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REv. 805 (1975).
70. The doctor in Kinloch worked in the medical dispensary of the Budd Company. Kinloch, 325 Pa. Super. at 477, 473 A.2d at 168.
71. Id. at 478, 473 A.2d at 169.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Potash v. Bonaccurso, 179 Pa. Super. 582, 588, 117 A.2d 803,
806 (1955)). Professional employees require special consideration in the area of control because of their unique skills. See Kay v. General Cable Corp., 144 F.2d 653 (3d
Cir. 1944) (difficult to have full control over a doctor because he is a highly trained
professional); L.M.T. Steel Prods., Inc., v. Pierson, 47 Md. App. 633, 425 A.2d 242
(1981) (when persons are employed in supervisory or authoritative roles, it is less
likely that employer has full control over individuals); Budzichowski v. Bell Tel. Co.,
of Pa., 503 Pa. 160, 469 A.2d 111 (1984) (doctor who has superior skills to supervisors
can still be employee even though full control is impossible because of his profession);
Babich v. Pavich, 270 Pa. Super. 140, 411 A.2d 218 (1980) (physician is an employee
regardless of fact that full control over him cannot be achieved). Professionals such as
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professional is involved, the control element may not need to be satisfied to the extent that is necessary in traditional employer-employee relationships. Surely, the doctor in Kinloch had technical
skills superior to many of the company superiors, and full control
over him was impossible. Consequently, the court held that even
though a professional person is involved, an employer-employee re75
lationship may still exist.
Like the doctor in Kinloch, Mr. Herbster was the chief legal
officer and vice-president in charge of the legal department for
North American. 76 He worked eight hours per day, five days per
week, fifty-two weeks a year.7 North American paid Mr. Herbster a
salary and gave him fringe benefits, similar to the doctor-employee
in Kinloch.7 8 Furthermore, Mr. Herbster, like the doctor, had special
skills that his supervisors did not possess, and full control over him
was unlikely due to the nature of an attorney's work. Pursuant to
the Kinloch court's reasoning, the element of control is less relevant
when a professional employee is involved.7 9 Thus, the Herbster
court, following the Kinloch reasoning, could have held that Mr.
Herbster was an employee. Indeed, there was no just reason to deny
that Mr. Herbster was an employee 8" entitled to a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge. The Herbster court unjustifiably denied Mr.
Herbster his rights" as an employee. 82 Illinois courts should give
deference to such persuasive authority 3 in order to adequately deattorneys, accountants, and doctors working in an employment capacity, almost always will have skills superior to their supervisors. Thus, case law reflects the issue
that full control over a professional is not necessary in determining whether the professional is an employee. For an extended analysis of the professional employee, see
supra notes 68-69.
75. Kinloch, 325 Pa. Super. at 478, 473 A.2d at 169.
76. Herbster v. North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 150 Ill. App. 3d 21, 23,
501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1986).
77. Telephone interview with John M. Bowlus, attorney for Robert W. Herbster
(February 16, 1987 and March 26, 1987).

78. Id.

79. For a discussion of the control element when a professional employee is involved, see supra note 74.
80. For a list of elements necessary to determine an employer-employee relationship, see supra notes 53-55. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (5th ed.
1979) (definition of an employee); H. REUSCHLEIN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY
AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 50-52 (1979) (definitions and elements of an employer-employee
relationship); H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 2 (1877)
(history and conditions of the master-servant relationship).
81. An argument can be made that Mr. Herbster was denied equal protection of
the law. Appellant's Brief for Leave to Appeal, supra note 44, at 15. The decision of
the Herbster court failed to protect Mr. Herbster the same way it would have protected a non-professional employee. Id. Thus, he was denied equal protection of the
law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (language of the equal protection clause); ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (no person can be denied equal protection of the law).
82. For a list of factors which constitute an employer-employee relationship, see
supra notes 53-55.
83. For an analysis of other jurisdictions dealing with the professional employee
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cide unprecedented issues.8 ' Instead, the Herbster court overlooked
sound case law,85 and based its decision on the attorney-client relationship.88 Therefore, the court found that an exception to the general rule of at will employment

7

was not permissible.

It is difficult to quarrel with the sacredness of the attorney-client relationship where the attorney is consulted to perform a noncontinuing service. Mr. Herbster, however, was a salaried employee

of North American and did not work on a contingent fee basis.
North American was his only employer and only client.88 Moreover,
the relationship between Mr. Herbster and North American was
continuous.88 Furthermore, contrary to the traditional attorney-client relationship, Mr. Herbster looked to North American for career
development, compensation, and job security. 90 Clearly, an attorney

dilemma, see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
84. The Herbster court stated that
[w]e must decide ... whether an attorney as general counsel and an employee
of a corporation is entitled to bring a claim for retaliatory discharge. Counsel
does not cite nor does our research disclose any case on point. Therefore, we
must examine the historical considerations of the tort itself and whether plaintiff is an employee within the meaning of established case law.
Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
85. Clearly, the court neglected to rely on persuasive authority, and failed to
make an analogy to the facts of this case with other professional employee cases. For
professional employee case law, see supra note 68-69.
86. The attorney-client relationship is based on trust and confidence. Rhoades
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 78 Ill. 2d 217, 222, 399 N.E.2d 969, 974 (1979). Consequently, a
client may discharge his attorney at any time, with or without cause. Tobias v. King,
84 Il1.App. 3d 998, 1000, 406 N.E.2d 101, 103 (1980). Because of obligations, which
are referred to as the fiduciary duty of the attorney, all phases of the relationship are
superseded and the employment contract can be breached. Herbster, 150 I11.App. 3d
at 27, 501 N.E.2d at 347. Thus, the right of discharge is implied in every attorneyclient relationship because of the confidential nature of the relationship. Rhoades, 78
Ill. 2d at 222, 399 N.E.2d at 974. See Tobias, 84 11. App. 3d at 1000, 406 N.E.2d at
103 (unless there is an agreement expressly stating that the client cannot discharge
his attorney, the attorney can be fired with or without cause). Cf. Warner v. Basten,
118 I11. App. 2d 419, 255 N.E.2d 72 (1970) (even though attorney can be discharged
with or without cause, he is still entitled to be compensated for his services). Furthermore, courts subject the attorney-client relationship to strict scrutiny and may declare transactions void which would be valid between other persons. Miller v. Solomon, 49 Ill.
App. 2d 156, 163, 199 N.E.2d 660, 667 (1964).
87. For a discussion of at will employment, see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
88. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344. The usual attorneyclient relationship consists of one attorney serving many clients. North American,
however, was Mr. Herbster's only client. Id. See also supra note 67.
89. Mr. Herbster was a salaried employee of North American. Herbster, 150 IIl.
App. 3d at 26, 501 N.E.2d at 346. He was not hired as an independent contractor/
outside counsel for the firm and worked on a full time basis. For authority supporting
Mr. Herbster's continuous service for North American, see supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text.
90. Unlike the traditional attorney-client relationship, which is usually temlorary employment and involves no career development, Mr. Herbster relied on North
American for indefinite career development. Herbster, 150 Ill. App. 3d at 24, 501
N.E.2d 346.
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working for a corporation on a full time s ' basis has a different relationship than the usual attorney-client alliance. Therefore, under
the circumstances where the attorney is working solely for one corporation, he should be considered an employee and be permitted to
bring a retaliatory discharge cause of action as a means of protecting
his rights.9 2 Also, one must consider the effect of denying an attorney employee status. Attorneys who work for banks, corporations,
and large law firms will be denied employee rights, especially the
right to a retaliatory discharge cause of action.
The Herbster court, in order to bar Mr. Herbster's retaliatory
discharge cause of action, premised its decision upon the attorneyclient relationship,93 rather than upon the traditional employer-employee relationship. One aspect of the attorney-client relationship
that the court relied on to support its decision is the attorney-client
privilege. 94 The attorney-client privilege exists to encourage a client

to consult freely with his attorney without fear of compelled disclosure of information.9 5 Although the attorney-client privilege applies
to all attorneys, 96 in all settings, 97 there are exceptions to the privi91. For a discussion of Mr. Herbster's full time employment with North American, see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Cf. Kinloch v. Tonsey, 325 Pa.
Super. 476, 473 A.2d 167 (1984) (professional employee working on a full time basis
can also practice independently and still be considered'an employee).
92. For a discussion of equal protection, see supra note 81.
93. The Herbster court held that Mr. Herbster, as an attorney, occupied a special position in society because of his profession and was precluded from bringing a
retaliatory discharge cause of action. Herbster, 150 Il1.App. 3d at 27, 501 N.E.2d at
346. For other characteristics of the attorney-client relationship, see supra note 86
and accompanying text.
94. The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
communications. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). The purpose of
the privilege is to encourage full and frank consultation between a client and an attorney, without the fear of compelled disclosure of the information. Consolidated
Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. App. 2d 103, 438 N.E.2d 150 (1982). Thus, full
disclosure will be promoted when the client knows that communications with his attorney cannot be extorted in court. See Cain, The Attorneys Obligation of Confidentiality-Its Effect on the Ascertainment of Truth in an Adversary System, GLENDALE
L. REv. 81 (1978) (history and foundation of the attorney-client privilege); Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationsof the Attorney-Client Privilege, 85 YALE
L.J. 1060 (1976) (discussion of policy rationale and history of the attorney-client privilege); Hazard, An HistoricalPerspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 1061 (1978) (history and fundamentals of the attorney-client privilege); See
generally C. MCCORMICK, McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 87-88 (3d ed. 1984) (background of attorney-client privilege); 8 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON
LAW §§ 2290-2292 (rev. ed. 1961) (history, policy, and general principles of the attorney-client privilege).
95. Consolidated Coal Co., 89 Ill. 2d at 117-18, 432 N.E.2d at 257. See also
People v. Adam, 51 Ill. 2d 46, 48, 28 N.E.2d 205, 207 (1972) (essentials for the creation of the attorney-client privilege).
96. See C.MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 88 (3d ed. 1984) (analysis of
the communications between attorney and client).
97. The corporate setting can cause much confusion on the issue of whether a
communication made to an in-house attorney is privileged. See Consolidated Coal
Co., 89 Ill. 2d at 103, 432 N.E.2d at 250 (attorney-client privilege is inapplicable if
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lege. ss When an exception arises, the privilege between the attorney

and his client is dissipated. One such exception to the privilege is
the fraud or crime exception."
The attorney-client privilege did apply to Mr. Herbster in his
capacity as an in-house corporate attorney. 0 0 North American officials, however, requested that Mr. Herbster remove or destroy dis-

covery documents. 10' Because this falls within the exception of
fraud,' 02 the attorney-client privilege between Mr. Herbster and
North American dissipated. The court, therefore, mistakenly based
its reasoning on the attorney-client relationship, 03 and should have
held that there was a clear exception to the attorney-client privilege
communication was not from a "control group" member); Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963) (corporation entitled to the same
treatment as any other client when asserting the attorney-client privilege). The "control group" test is a means of defining the client in the corporate setting. Day v.
Illinois Power Co., 50 II. App. 2d 52, 199 N.E.2d 802 (1964). See also Johnson v.
Frontier Ford, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 3d 315, 386 N.E.2d 112 (1979) (determines who is
entitled to the attorney-client privilege in a corporate setting). The "control group"
test, however, was rejected by the United States Supreme Court as the governing test
in the federal courts. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). For a discussion of the attorneyclient privilege, and its applicability to the corporate setting, see generally Burnham,
Confidentiality and the Corporate Lawyer: The Attorney-Client Privilege and
"Work Product" in Illinois, 56 ILL. B.J. 542 (1968) (attorney-client privilege and its
role in a corporate setting); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate Clients:
The Control Group Test, 84 HARv L. REV. 424 (1970) (determination of a corporate
client and his right to the attorney-client privilege); Comment, The Lawyer-Client
Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 N.w. U.L. REV. 235 (1961) (scope of the attorney-client privilege and
relevant communications).
98. For examples of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, see ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, DR 1-102, 4-101, 7-102 (1985) (an attorney's duty to disclose information under certain circumstances and the inapplicability of the attorney-client privilege when fraud is implicated).
99. Since the attorney-client privilege is deeply embedded in the effective administration of justice, it would be illogical to extend the privilege to communications
which reveal the client's intent to commit a fraud or a crime. See Gardner, The
Crime or Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege. 47 A.B.A. J. 708 (1961)
(case law and establishment of the fraud or crime exception); Comment, WitnessCompetency- Whether Confidential Relations by Client to Attorney Regarding Future Criminal or Fraudulent Transactions Must be Divulged, 33 CHI. KENT L. REV.
271 (1955) (the attorney-client privilege is lost if abused). See, e.g., In re Berkley &
Co., 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980) (documents prepared as part of a continuing fraudulent or illegal scheme are not privileged); United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655 (7th
Cir. 1973) (communications involving securities and mail frauds are not privileged).
See generally 81 Am. JuR. 2D Witnesses § 285 (1970) (policy exceptions to the attorney-client privilege).
100. For a discussion of the attorney-client privilege and its applicability to inhouse corporate attorneys, see supra notes 96-97.
101. Herbster,150 11. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344. For a discussion of the
subpoenaed documents, see supra note 18.
102. Mr. Herbster would have committed a fraud on the Alabama court had he
removed or destroyed the discovery documents. Id. For a discussion of the crime or
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, see supra note 99.
103. For a discussion of the attorney-client relationship, see supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
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Herbster v. North American Company

because of possible fraud.""4 Thus, there was no reason to deny the
retaliatory discharge cause of action in Mr. Herbster's case.
Additionally, the Herbster court failed to recognize the public
policy ramifications"'5 of denying Mr. Herbster's retaliatory discharge cause of action. In the landmark case of Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,106 the Illinois Supreme Court recognized
that when an employee is discharged in contravention of a clearly
mandated public policy, an exception to the employment at will rule
exists and the wrongfully discharged employee should be granted a
retaliatory discharge cause of action.10 7 In Palmateer, an employee
was discharged for reporting a possible violation of a crime.10 s The
court held that the public policy at stake was one of favoring the
effective protection of the lives and property of citizens. 09 Because
of the magnitude of this policy, the court allowed the discharged
employee to bring a retaliatory discharge cause of action to recover
damages.110
Mr. Herbster, like the plaintiff in Palmateer,was discharged for
reporting a possible fraud on a court. "' The fundamental public
policy at stake in Herbster was the prevention of an obstruction of
justice. " 2 Nevertheless, the Herbster court failed to redress this
clear violation of public policy, and denied Mr. Herbster's retaliatory discharge cause of action. Both the plaintiff in Palmateer,and
Mr. Herbster were discharged in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy. " Because the cases are analogous, and in addition to the fact that an employer-employee relationship existed in
Mr. Herbster's case, the Herbster court's decision to deny Mr. Herbster a remedy" 4 is without merit. Furthermore, the fact that Mr.
104. Fraud does not have to be actually committed as long as the contemplated
crime would or might inure to the client's benefit. In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 901 (2d
Cir. 1977).
105. The Herbster court acknowledged that a clearly mandated public policy
had been contravened. It failed, however, to redress the clear violation. Herbster, 150
Ill. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344. Consequently, attorneys will find little wrong
with committing unethical acts pursuant to the Herbster court's reasoning. Furthermore, ethical responsibilities will become obsolete due to the fear of unemployment
after an attorney refuses to perform an unethical act.
106. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
107. For a discussion of retaliatory discharge, and the necessary elements to
state a cause of action, see supra notes 3-4, 9.
108. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 127, 421 N.E.2d
876, 877 (1981).
109. Id. at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
110. For a discussion of damages for retaliatory discharge, see infra note 114.
111. Herbster, 150 11. App. 3d at 23, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
112. Id.
113. For a discussion of public policy and determining whether it exists in a
given case, see supra notes 13, 27.
114. In Illinois, compensatory and punitive damages can be recovered under a
retaliatory discharge cause of action. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Il1.
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Herbster is an attorney is irrelevant under these circumstances.
The court's pejorative opinion failed to adequately analyze
whether an attorney can be an employee in certain situations. Instead, the court relied on an unconvincing policy rationale based on
the attorney-client relationship. A more thorough analysis would
have led the court to a different conclusion. In failing to recognize
Mr. Herbster as an employee, the court has cast a dark shadow over
the rights of an attorney when the attorney is also an employee.
Even though the court should have expanded the tort of retaliatory
discharge to an unprotected employment setting, it delivered a barren opinion. Illinois courts must recognize an attorney as an employee in certain situations, and carve out an exception to the general rule of at will employment for a retaliatory discharge cause of
action. Both attorney-employees and traditional employees deserve
the same protection when they are discharged in contravention of a
clearly mandated public policy. Without this protection, attorneyemployees will continue to be on unequal footing with their
employers.
Dennis M. Nolan

2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Kelsay, 74 Il. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978). The
potential liability for damages is greater in tort actions rather than in contract.
Montavlo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1970). Damages, however,

are sparsely discussed in retaliatory discharge cases. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 169
W. Va. 673, 681, 289 S.E.2d 692, 700 (1982). See generally W. HOLLOWAY, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES

wrongful discharge, including reinstatement);

397 (1985) (remedies and damages for
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908

(1979) (awarding and amount of punitive damages in tort cases).

